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Ongoing Projects

Memory Models

“All models are wrong; some are useful.” – George Box

Some of the basic goals of science are to be able to describe, explain, and predict the world around and within us. The goal of looking at models of recognition memory is the same: what models do the best job of explaining and predicting how memory works in different situations? Some models assume that recognition memory is based on a single process (strength) and other assume two processes (e.g., recollection and familiarity, or memory strength and attention). Thus, there is some disagreement about how many processes we need to explain recognition, and even models that propose multiple processes don’t necessarily agree on what those processes are. We’re interested in which models provide the best descriptions, explanations, and predictions of recognition memory.  For example, which model can best predict how we’ll remember a name-face association? And what types of memory processes does the model say we use to remember that association? Do we need different models to understand different situations?

Representative Publications: 

Yonelinas, A. P., & Parks, C. M.  (2007). Receiver operating characteristics in recognition memory: A review. Psychological Bulletin, 133, 800-832.                                 

                                                                  

Parks, C. M. & Yonelinas, A. P.  (2007). Moving beyond pure signal detection models:  Comment on Wixted (2007). Psychological Review, 114, 188-202.  

Parks, C.M. (2015).  Looking for graded recollection: Manipulating the number of details does not affect recollection variance. Memory & Cognition, 43, 164 – 169.

Memory Change

When an established (consolidated) memory is activated by a cue it becomes fragile and has to undergo a process of reconsolidation to return to a stable state. While it’s in a fragile state it can be changed in ways that may or may not distort the original memory. This pattern has been well established in non-human animals in different memory systems and in human procedural and fear memory. There is also evidence of reconsolidation in human episodic memory but the nature of the process is still unclear. For example, how similar is it to other memory phenomena, such as the misinformation effect? We’re interested in how reconsolidation works in human episodic memory and, to the extent that it does, what processes and representations it affects. As asked in this Radiolab podcast, is it true that our most correct memories are the ones we’ve never brought back to mind?

 

Representative Publications:

Parks, C.M., Mohawk, K.D., Werner, L.L.S, & Kiley, C. (2022). The Time Window of Reconsolidation: A Replication. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review.   

Kiley, C., & Parks, C. M. (2022). Mechanisms of Memory Updating: State Dependency vs. Reconsolidation. Journal of Cognition, 5(1): 7, pp. 1–13.

Kiley, C., & Parks, C.M. (2020). Generalizing reconsolidation: Spatial context and prediction error. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1747021820922555.

Forgetting

Past theories of forgetting posited that decay and proactive interference were to blame. Those theories were discarded when it was shown that proactive interference didn't explain everyday forgetting, and (passive) decay was deemed an unscientific theory. However, more recent work has revived forgetting research and suggests that active decay is a plausible cause of forgetting, as is retroactive interference. 

Naturalistic Stimuli

Memory theories have primarily been tested with verbal stimuli (e.g., lists of words), and sometimes pictures. Recent cognitive neuroscience research has begun using more naturalistic stimuli (e.g., movie clips), but theories about memory, such as the DPSD model, have not been tested with such stimuli.

Memory for Similar Episodes

Mistaking a current event for a very similar previous one is a common mistake, as shown by research using the Process Dissociation Procedure (PDP), the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) procedure, and the Mnemonic Similarity Task (MST) procedure. We have proposed that false alarms in each of these paradigms are due to an interaction betwween three underlying processes: false recollection, false familiarity, and recollection rejection. Previously-published group-level data have supported this model, but it has yet to be tested at the individual level.

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